What is happiness?-The Benthamite equation of happiness with (mere) pleasure was rejected early on by Mill, for whom the happiness to be maximised was eudaimonia or human flourishing. (As Mill put it, "Better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied."3) Contemporary utilitarians, accepting people's variability, their powerful desire for autonomy, and their different perceptions of what it is to flourish, tend to aim to maximise satisfaction of individuals' autonomous preferences as being the best way of maximising overall happiness. 4 Measuring happiness (and suffering) is clearly a major problem for utilitarianism, but modern utilitarians tend to agree with their spiritual accomplices, modern economists, in accepting that people can roughly measure at least their personal assessments of happiness and suffering5 analagously to the way they can measure benefits and disbenefits in monetary terms (by buying goods or insurance policies and in their betting behaviour).
Maximising happiness-As for whether it is total happiness, average happiness, or something else that is to be maximised, a common response is to accept the widespread human concern with fairness as a fact about human nature and therefore aim at net average preference satisfaction as the appropriate goal. Its achievement can be expected as a matter of fact to maximise total happiness.6 Scope-The problems concerning to what or whom the moral theory applies are not unique to utilitarianism; deontological ethical theories may be just as troubled about how to incorporate nonhuman animals, very young human beings, and permanently unconscious human beings within their theoretical framework. Modern utilitarians tend to accept the (extraordinarily radical) Benthamite claim that anything that can suffer falls within the scope ofmorality7 but they may accommodate the intuition that people are morally more important by differentiating according to the differing "interests" of people and lower animals.8
As for the somewhat abstruse debate about whether the scope of utilitarianism should include only existing sentient beings, existing and future sentient beings, or all possible sentient beings, suffice it here to assert that the problem is no greater for utilitarianism than it is for other types of ethical theory and that the most plausible option seems to me to be the second alternative. The first would exclude the moral interests of people who will exist but have not yet come into existence and the third would require moral consideration to be given to an infinite number of people and animals that will never exist. (This support of the second option in no way excludes from being morally relevant counterfactual consideration of possible people who might be affected by a contemplated action.) JUSTIFICATION The justification of utilitarianism remains a major problem. Bentham in effect merely asserted it, for even if it were universally agreed that happiness was a good and suffering an evil it would not follow that maximising happiness was morally obligatory or, even if it were, that it was the only, or the overriding, moral principle. Mill's notoriously inadequate quasi proof does not work either. (He argued that each person's happiness is a good to that person and the general happiness was therefore a good to the aggregate of all persons9). In more recent times Hare has offered arguments whereby he claims that a version of utilitarianism is derivable solely from an analysis of the meaning and logic of the moral words we use and in particular the word ought and its cognates.'0 Those who reject Hare's arguments may simply point out that the problem of ultimate justification is no more of a problem for utilitarianism (and no less) than it is for any other moral theory.
RESULTS
The third category of objections to utilitarianism comprises the counterintuitive results that it seems to entail. Thus if overall maximisation of welfare is the supreme moral objective the individual seems to be in permanent jeopardy before the overriding interests of society. The ordinary intuitive deontological moral principles that govern our relationships, such as respect for the integrity of each other's persons, for each other's autonomy, for promise keeping, honesty, and openness, for fairness and justice, and for the moral importance of special relationships, all seem disposable whenever overall maximisation of welfare requires us to ignore them.
Utilitarians have various defences to such criticisms, all turning on some variant of the claim that toleration ofbehaviour that ignores these principles is not conducive to maximisation of welfare. So called "act utilitarians," while judging each action or proposed action individually, in practice tend in specific cases to argue that adherence to conventional moral principles will in fact tend to maximise welfare. "Rule utilitarians" argue that even when the individual action may be expected to maximise welfare by contravening one of the conventional deontological moral principles the principle should still be followed because institutionalisation of such principles can be expected as a matter of empirical fact to maximise welfare. J S Mill himself can be understood to have argued that the principle of respect for autonomy-insofar as such respect was compatible with respect for the autonomy of all-was a fundamental component of utilitarianism given that the exercise of autonomy was a prerequisite of human flourishing. Among the utilitarians who have done most to accommodate ordinary deontological moral principles within a utilitarian framework R M Hare is again notable.'" (He also gives arguments whereby the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism in effect collapses and the insights of both are maintained.) In their helpful textbook on biomedical ethics Beauchamp and Childress (one a utilitarian, the other a deontologist) show how in practice both sides of this theoretical divide can agree on what might be termed working moral principles to be used in consideration of medicomoral issues.
Conclusion
Of course, difficult philosophical problems remain. There are many utilitarian moral theories and not all are as sympathetic to the inclusion of deontological moral principles within their utilitarian structures as are Hare and Beauchamp and Childress. Most, however, have developed complicated ways of accommodating the standard deontological counterarguments to utilitarianism based on the counterintuitive results of a gross or simplistic version of utilitarian thinking, and in practice at least it seems to me that there need be no unbridgable incompatibility between non-absolutist pluralist deontological theories and utilitarianism. 
